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Critics of statesmanship in democracy make three arguments. First, scholars claim that the idea 
of democratic statesmanship is, itself, is a contradiction.1 Reasoning that there is an inherent 
tension between popular rule grounded on equality and liberty and the political requirement of 
decisive action, these scholars hold that elected political officials should simply execute the will 
of the people. Benjamin Barber makes the most dramatic argument on this front claiming that 
statesmanship undermines democratic politics.2 He contends that in an age such as ours, it is 
possible, safer, more fulfilling, and more just to allow citizens to exercise political judgment. 
Thus, any need democracy may have had for a statesman has run its course. 
Building on this argument, second, democratic theorists contend that statesmanship actually 
destabilizes democracies as statesmen become a source of factional conflict.3 The concern here is 
not just that statesmanship undermines the goal of political stability, but that statesmanship will 
degenerate into tyranny. Consequently, statesmanship is not a feature of democracy, but an 
alternative to democracy. Instead of relying on statesmen, all that is needed is effective 
citizenship which can be achieved by freeing citizens from the restrictions imposed by statesmen.  
Finally, scholars argue that statesmanship is no longer possible. As for why this is the case, 
scholars identify a host of explanations. Gueguen places the blame for America’s faltering 
leadership on the loss of esteem for public office, the growing apathy that characterizes the 
American people, and the weakening of America’s moral foundations.4 Burns attributes the 
decline to the lack of a clear standard by which to measure leadership.5 Storing agrees with 
Gueguen and Burns that the loss of our intellectual roots explains the loss of statesmanship in 
America.6 The problem, according to Storing, is that the political thought of the Founders has 
been replaced by the reign of popular opinion and the rise of scientific management commonly 
associated with the political thinking of the Progressives. 
Despite these three arguments, some democratic theorists contend that statesmanship and 
democracy are not inconsistent ideas. Bruce Ackerman provides a vision of statesmanship that 
emphasizes the promotion of mutual dialogue. The problem with Ackerman’s effort is that he 
effectively reduces the statesman to the political arbiter or political leader.7 As the next section 
explains, there is a fundamental difference between statesmanship on the one hand and 
leadership on the other. Whereas statesmanship emphasizes the cultivation of personal and civic 
virtues, leaders are merely responsible for reconciling the interests of the public.8 To the extent 
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that democratic theory draws on the insights of modern political philosophy and not ancient 
political thought, democratic theory must look to institutions and figures other than the statesman 
for the cultivation of the capacities and character traits required for self-government. In 
particular, democratic theory and democracies must look to the public intellectual who, like the 
ancient statesman, sees to the development of civic virtue. As argued here, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson not only argues for the necessity of the public intellectual as statesman, he serves as a 
model for this figure in a democratic society.  
 
Ancients, Moderns and Statesmanship 
 
Despite their differences, a common aspect of theorizing about statesmanship is that it is 
grounded in ancient political thought. Cropsey, drawing on Plato’s Statesman, views 
statesmanship as connecting political philosophy and politics.9 The task of the political 
philosopher is to understand the relation of thought and political life and implement this 
understanding. Paul Eidelberg develops an Aristotelian model where the statesman coordinates 
political theory and political practice via constant recourse to the common good.10 This recourse 
is not simply a rhetorical device, but a reasoned justification for his course of action which 
people can understand. This reasoned defense is important because it allows the statesman to 
gradually modify the intellectual and moral horizons of the people from the private to the public. 
Based on his reading of Plato’s Gorgias, Denis Bathory contends that the fundamental job of the 
statesman is to make the people better.11 Unlike political leaders who emphasize the diverse 
needs and wants of men, the statesman’s concern is with teaching and training people to look 
beyond the satisfaction of their apparent and immediate wants.12 
In drawing on the insights of the ancients, Cropsey, Eidelberg, and Bathory highlight the 
central role of the statesman in the ancient idea of paideia. According to the ancients, paideia is 
an educational process that aims at the cultivation of the ideal citizen/person.13 The responsibility 
for this cultivation falls to the statesman. In his Statesman, Plato argues that the correct regime is 
characterized by a certain judging and supervising science which is to say that the correct regime 
is defined by the presence of statesmanship.14 Like a doctor, the statesman applies his art to the 
health of the city.15 The ability of the statesman to bring health to the city, like a doctor’s ability 
to restore health to the body, depends in large measure on the material they are working with. 
According to Plato, it is necessary that the statesman begins with the best materials possible.16 In 
the ordering of the city, this requires the statesman to concern himself with the moral quality and 
development of the citizenry. Charged with selecting the teachers who pursue a model of 
philosophic education devoted to achieving a certain fitting character, the statesman’s ability to 
successfully weave together the tapestry of society depends primarily on his ability to get the 
right materials which is the result of proper education. 
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The philosophic quality of this education cannot be overstated, as Jaeger highlights the 
centrality of philosophy to guide human change.17 The key to this process is morphosis, a term 
implying that the essential identity of all educational activity is the formation of man.18 In other 
words, only philosophy has the ability to change man in the appropriate way. Plato makes this 
very argument in his Apology where he draws a clear distinction between political and 
philosophic discourse. According to Plato, the former concerns itself with the appearance of 
justice and the latter with justice itself.19 In concerning itself with the mere appearance of justice, 
political discourse appeals to human passions instead of reason. Like the many whose opinion it 
panders to, political discourse cares for the wrong things. Instead of focusing on truth, wisdom, 
and the state of the soul, political discourse focuses most on what matters least: wealth, honor, 
reputation, and political faction.20  
As the example of Plato shows, the ancient view of statesmanship is essential for the city and 
individual to reach their full potential. As Reid summarizes, statesmanship 
 
has its roots in personal virtue, which requires intentional cultivation and a study 
of nature that leads to a realization of the world’s unity and interdependence. This 
realization inspires an appreciation of our communities and a desire to serve them, 
not through rules and punishment, but by helping others to cultivate their own 
virtue. This help comes primarily through the expression of noble action of the 
leader’s own virtue, which acts like a magnet to draw the community together and 
inspire individuals to better themselves.21 
 
The statesman is the centerpiece of the constant care that is paideia and is fundamentally 
responsible for the cultivation and development of the citizenry’s moral and intellectual virtues.22 
This understanding of the statesman stands in sharp contrast to modern political thought’s 
concern with political leadership. Benjamin Constant identifies a key aspect of modern political 
thinking that removes the responsibility for the moral development of the citizenry from the 
sphere of politics—the public/private distinction.23 For ancients, the highest good is understood 
in political terms. For moderns, leaders are to take care of the necessary business while leaving 
space for the rest of us to devote our attention to the private sphere. 
In developing the public/private dichotomy, modern political thought no longer requires the 
presence of morally virtuous rulers and removes the responsibility of moral education and 
development from the hands of politicians. Machiavelli, for example, famously tells his reader 
that to emphasize virtue as do the ancients is to guarantee one’s political failure.24 Locke places 
the responsibility for the moral development of individuals in the hands of the family and makes 
education largely a private matter.25 This is not to say that the cultivation of a virtuous citizenry 
does not matter for modern political thought; it is only to say that they do not rely on statesmen 
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to do this. As the example of Tocqueville that follows demonstrates, the virtues of citizenship are 
largely cultivated in the private sphere. 
Central to the ability of democracy to remain self-governing and self-sustaining is the 
development of proper mores.26 The development of mores, according to Tocqueville, is largely 
a consequence of the indirect effects of religion as America is “still the place in the world where 
the Christian religion has more preserved genuine power over souls.”27 In exercising this power, 
religion limits the imaginations of citizen and makes the exercise of freedom possible. It limits 
the imagination in the sense that certain ideas and behaviors are held to be outside of what is 
morally acceptable. Tocqueville explains that “while the law permits the American people to do 
everything, religion prevents them from conceiving everything and forbids them to dare 
everything.”28 Religion’s ability to restrict and limit is of crucial importance in a country that 
places so much emphasis on the accumulation of wealth. On this point, Tocqueville writes: 
 
The principle business of religion is to purify, regulate, and restrain the too ardent 
taste for well-being that men in times of equality feel; but I believe they would be 
wrong to try to subdue it entirely and to destroy it. They will not succeed in 
turning man away from the love of wealth; but they can still persuade them to 
enrich themselves only by honest means.29 
 
To achieve these desired effects, religious beliefs should be dogmatic.30 The dogmatic quality of 
these beliefs is necessary so as to “shield” ideas about God, the human soul, and our duties 
toward God from “the habitual action of individual reason.”31 Given the Cartesian quality of the 
American mind, to subject religious beliefs to this extreme skepticism undermines religion’s 
ability to positively shape mores. 
In highlighting the importance of religion for the cultivation of proper mores, Tocqueville 
speaks directly to the primacy of the private sphere and, in particular, the role of the American 
clergy in performing one of the key functions of the ancient statesman—the cultivation of an 
enlightened and virtuous citizenry.32 According to Tocqueville, religion enjoys a “peaceful 
dominion” in America principally because of the “complete separation of church and state.”33 
The clergy not only do not hold public office, but go out of their way to “distance themselves 
from power” and take “a sort of professional pride in remaining strangers to it.”34 The clergy 
recognizes that religion must remain within its “proper bounds” and “not seek to leave them” as 
doing so raises the possibility of religion “no longer being believed in any matter.”35 
As the contrast between ancients and moderns makes clear, one should not expect modern, 
liberal thought to be able to provide the moral education sought by the ancients. In large measure 
this is because liberalism leaves open the question of the highest human good. Ancient political 
thinking recognizes the centrality of this question as an understanding of the good is necessary if 
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one is to develop a model of education that facilitates living a morally serious life. Even to the 
extent that liberal discourse does offer a thinner morality, its reliance on skepticism calls into 
question its own principles of justice and morality. Moreover, as long as liberalism continues to 
assert the separation between the public world of the citizen and the private world of the 
individual, it denies the educative function of the state and the laws. The lack of statesmanship 
that characterizes modern political thought requires one to look elsewhere for the model of 
paideia that makes democratic governance possible. Given the public/private distinction, one 
must look to the private sphere for statesmen. As demonstrated in the next section, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson recognizes the need for a statesmanlike figure to engage in the moral education of a 
democratic people and his writings and life are fruitfully interpreted in light of this goal. 
 
Emerson and the American Paideia 
 
Critics of Emerson question the philosophic quality of his essays. They complain that Emerson’s 
argument(s) lack coherence as they illuminate in multiple directions without ever actually 
settling an issue. Stephen Whicher argues that Emerson is too general, vague, and obvious to 
provide a comprehensive ethical theory.36 Joel Porte contends that Emerson’s ethical teaching 
suffers from an inconsistency as he is a radical in some areas (religion, society and literature) and 
conservative in the area of ethics.37 Given these limitations, some scholars go so far as to suggest 
that Emerson is too concerned with power to speak to ethical questions. Instead, Emerson is 
thought to evade more difficult philosophical questions in favor of more pragmatic solutions to 
the problems of the day.38 
Despite these arguments, the general scholarly consensus is that philosophy and ethics are so 
central to Emerson’s intellectual enterprise that Judith Shklar refers to Emerson as “the 
American philosopher.”39 As Richardson shows, Emerson’s life and work represents a continued 
effort to refute the skepticism of David Hume.40 In doing so, Emerson takes up the key question 
of ethical thinking: How shall I live?41 Like the philosophic minds he was so interested in, 
Emerson’s primary concern is with how ethics shapes individual thought and action.42 This 
explains, to a considerable degree, Emerson’s fundamental concern with education and his 
critique of public education.43 According to Shklar, Emerson: 
 
thought the official reason for public education cynical. It was argued that with 
universal suffrage, even the lower classes needed education to turn them into 
reasonable, property-loving voters. The character and needs and hopes and 
possibilities of individual children were of no concern. Those attributes would not 
help their development or power of self-education or help them to become self-
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reliant individuals with minds of their own. To Emerson an education that did not 
attempt more than to constrain was no education at all; it was betrayal.44 
 
As the criticism shows, Emerson is concerned with more than the effects of education. He is 
concerned with developing the moral quality of the American citizenry which is done by 
providing the incentive for thinking philosophically.45 Proof is this is provided by Emerson’s 
support of Amos Bronson Alcott’s Temple School. Established in 1834, the Temple School 
introduced an entirely new plan of education. Based on the Transcendental view of education 
that stressed active intelligence over passive absorption, Alcott recommended a method of close 
questioning of a gentle and persistent sort that closely resembled the Socratic method. The 
objective of the method was to instill self-trust in the students by focusing on their moral 
development.46 Alcott’s position on public education thus mirrors the criticism of higher 
education provided by Emerson in “American-Scholar.” Both fear the emphasis on conformity 
that constrains the philosophic discourse necessary for the development of whole individuals 
capable of thinking and acting for themselves.47 
Given Emerson’s emphasis on philosophic thinking and education, it remains to be 
determined what Emerson’s understanding of philosophic education is and why it is necessary. 
Moreover, it is necessary to determine what the goal of this model of education is. The next 
section identifies Emerson’s diagnosis for what is wrong with the individual and American 
society. The section that follows lays out Emerson’s educational remedy for these problems and 
the final section responds to a criticism for the argument advanced here from within Emerson’s 
own writings. 
 
Emerson’s Diagnosis of the Ills of American Democracy and Society 
 
From his publication of “Nature” in 1836 to the publication of a selection of his favorite poems 
in 1874, one of Emerson’s fundamental concerns is with the state of the human soul. As Emerson 
writes, “I only wish to indicate the true position of nature in regard to man, wherein to establish 
man, all right education tends; as the ground which to attain is the object of human life, that is, a 
man’s connection to nature.”48 Only by properly understanding man’s relation to nature (a term 
Emerson uses interchangeably between its philosophic and aesthetic senses) and building a 
system of education on this understanding does it become possible for man to know what it 
means to be human and, consequently, how man should live. The problem, as Emerson sees it, is 
that man is divorced from nature and, consequently, alienated from himself.49 Emerson portrays 
alienated man as the opposite of the child who is described as being whole.50 Children are whole 
in the sense that their inward and outward senses remain truly adjusted to one another.51 This 
allows the child to be “independent” whereas the divided adult is “clapped into jail” by his or her 
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consciousness.52 By consciousness, Emerson does not refer to the internal mechanism that 
regulates human behavior. Emerson refers to the internal mechanism that regulates human 
behavior as the moral sense which has been rendered weak and unable to perform this function 
because of man’s divorce from nature. Consciousness, as used here, refers to the external 
considerations of others as the limits on human behavior and thought instead of one’s own 
character.53 Where the child is independent, man is a conformist. 
Man’s almost exclusive focus on external matters renders him broken. Emerson describes 
man as lacking “unity, and lies broken in heaps” because “man is disunited with himself.”54 Man 
is now “timid and apologetic” because he no longer has self-trust.55 The breakdown of man into 
“a thing” allows each of us to be defined by the social function we play instead of being and end 
worthy of moral consideration. Thus, Emerson’s scholar degenerates into “mere thinker” instead 
of “Man thinking.”56 The problem here is that the act of thinking is divorced from the 
understanding of what it means to be human. We no longer turn our thoughts inward in 
consideration of the soul. Our exclusive focus lies with the external world. 
The question to emerge naturally here is why this is the case? Emerson answers this question 
by pointing to certain aspects of society/culture. First, Emerson is critical of the emphasis placed 
on tradition.57 For Emerson, the argument in favor of tradition is problematic in that it denies 
subsequent generations the opportunity to have an original relationship with nature which only 
adds to the division of man. Emerson opens “Nature” by asking the following: “Why should not 
we enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should we not have a poetry and philosophy 
of insight and not tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not by the history of theirs?”58 
In asking for a revelation of our own, Emerson points his reader to the argument he will make 
against historical Christianity in his “Divinity School Address.” The first defect of historical 
Christianity, according to Emerson, is that it fails to provide a doctrine of the soul.59 Instead of 
emphasizing religion’s relationship to the human soul, historical Christianity places too much 
emphasis on the person of Jesus. Focusing on the person of Jesus suggests that what truly matters 
for religion is getting the facts about the life and times of Jesus correct instead the inspirational 
quality of his message. This means, second, that religion as practiced in Emerson’s New England 
and taught at the Harvard Divinity School fails to explore man’s moral nature.60 Cumulatively, 
the two problems with historical Christianity have the effect of treating Jesus as if he were dead 
instead of showing how the message of Jesus teaches us “the duties of life” and “converts life 
into truth.”61 
To counter the “absence of faith” historical Christianity engenders due to historicism’s 
“coldness,” religion must return its focus to the individual soul.62 At a practical level, this 
requires every individual to pursue an inherently private and personal relationship with the 
divine.63 At an intellectual level, this requires the scholar to confront the skepticism that informs 
historicism and to offer an alternative. The problem with historicism’s extreme skepticism is that 
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it denies the student the ability to “manly” contemplate “the whole.”64 Instead, the emphasis on 
empiricism clouds “the sight of man with the very knowledge of functions and processes” it 
provides.65 The emphasis on parsimony unnecessarily and dangerously reduces the whole of 
nature to the simplest explanations. Emerson’s problem with skepticism on this front is that it 
fails to provide a theory of creation. To arrive at a theory of creation, it is necessary to have 
recourse to areas of thought other than history and science. One needs to look at areas that 
emphasize creativity—poetry and philosophy.66 Emerson says we should accept the truth that 
“poetry comes nearer to vital truth than history.”67 The poet and philosopher’s concern with 
creativity, or putting thought into action, serves as Emerson’s great response to skepticism. He 
wants man to think for himself and then to trust his own thought when acting. 
That Emerson desires this is seen in his critique of the reform movements of his day. Modern 
reform, according to Emerson, has a large horizon. It is no longer enough for these movements to 
reform our daily employments, our households, and institutions of property. What is needed is a 
total revision of our social structure, state, school, religion, views on marriage, trade, science, 
and understanding of our own nature.68 While Emerson commends these reformers for their 
desire to improve the condition of man, he is critical of the nature of their reform as they miss the 
proper object of genuine reform—the individual soul.69 Emerson rejects the proposition that you 
can improve man by simply improving his circumstances. Modern reform movements see reform 
in purely political or instrumental terms. For them, reform is a consequence of bringing together 
a critical mass of men.70 Emerson views this in starkly different terms, arguing that what they 
truly rely on is fear, wrath, and the spirit of party.71 The reformer’s emphasis on power is a 
response to the fact that the private domain is completely off limits. Reform must focus on those 
things that lie outside of the private sphere. The problem is that there can be no genuine social 
reform for Emerson if individuals are not first reformed themselves. It is the job of reformer, like 
the ancient statesman, to facilitate the self-cultivation of proper character traits which leads this 
discussion to Emerson’s remedy for the ills he finds in America. 
 
Emerson’s Educational Remedy 
 
That Emerson recommends education, or paideia, as the solution to the aforementioned problems 
should not be that surprising. He was a leading figure in the Lyceum movement which was 
originally intended to expand the knowledge of young men already employed in mills and other 
industrial enterprises. While originally to emphasize scientific knowledge, the Lyceum quickly 
extended it range of topics to include history, theology, philosophy and politics.72 Delivering a 
series of lectures in the evening, after then end of the work day, the Lyceum speeches sought to 
improve the education of Americans.  
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According to Emerson, the primary task of education is to redeem the soul of man.73 By 
restoring the world’s original and eternal beauty through the study of nature, man will see and 
come to believe in the correct understanding of virtue.74 The common view of virtue is that it is 
not common and that you can distinguish between man and virtue.75 For Emerson, this 
consequence of skepticism contributes to the breakdown of man. It becomes possible to combat 
this when one recognizes that “what we do not call education is more precious than what we call 
education.”76 For Emerson, an education in nature has the effect of reconnecting man and 
virtue.77 In the recognition that virtue is a sentiment within all of us, man is able to renounce 
himself to virtue and in doing so he “comes to himself” and the unity of man is restored.78 
This moral education is to be provided through things like the Lyceum movement and through 
popular writing. Emerson’s concern with the act of writing and its moral consequences places 
him in the company of Montaigne, Bacon, and Hume. As Ryan Patrick Hanley demonstrates in 
his analysis of Hume’s My Own Life, the essayist brings his wisdom directly to a popular 
audience in a format and language that is more easily accessed and, consequently, has the effect 
of improving the moral quality of the people.79 Employing the imagery of Plato’s “Allegory of 
the Cave,” Emerson’s scholar is to “cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts 
amidst appearances.”80 Finding consolation in the exercise of the highest functions of human 
nature, the scholar “breathes and lives on public and illustrious thoughts.”81 In doing so, the goal 
of the scholar is to alter one’s “state of mind” by persuading man to open himself to the internal 
life of the moral sense.82 This is no easy task as there is something in the nature of man that 
inclines him to conform and a general resistance to those who, like the scholar, set no value on 
tradition, but emphasize what one thinks.83  
Emerson’s scholar, like Socrates, will be resisted and must consequently demonstrate 
courage. “Manlike,” the scholar must resist conforming to conventional wisdom in his effort to 
“inspect its [nature’s] origins.”84 Here, the scholar communes with “the most important influence 
on his mind and he must, for himself, settle the question of what constitutes the value of nature in 
his own life.”85 Consideration of this question distinguishes, for Emerson, his thought from the 
skepticism he associates with Hume, natural science and history. In particularly poetic language, 
Emerson writes that man and nature “proceed from one root; one is leaf and one is flower; 
relation, sympathy, stirring in every vein. And what is that root? Is not the soul of his soul?—A 
thought too bold,—a dream too wild.”86 Where Hume’s natural philosophy, in recognition of the 
limits of the philosophic enterprise, stops at a description of how nature functions, Emerson calls 
for the scholar and any man thinking to reform the soul. For Emerson, the insights of natural 
philosophy are merely “first gropings” in an effort to “know thyself” by studying nature.87 
When man, inspired and cajoled by the scholar, comes to an understanding of himself he 
discovers that he is not only inseparable from virtue, but that he must trust that virtue. In Chapter 
Six of The Conduct of Life, entitled “Worship,” Emerson argues that the moral sense has the 
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power to counterweight the skepticism that results from leaning too heavily on fate, practical 
power, and trade.88 Here, Emerson does not argue that we should not be skeptical. He argues that 
we should give skepticism “as much line as we can” but not so much line that it “breaks down 
the natural belief” in morality that “we are all born with.”89 The moral sense has the effect of 
returning man to completeness. No longer distrustful of human virtue, the presence of an active 
moral sense distinguishes the shallow man from the strong man. Where the former believes in 
luck and explains everything as a consequence of circumstance, the latter denies Hume’s 
conclusion that cause and effect cannot be proven and boldly asserts not only its existence, but 
its truth.90 The key to this is for the people to recognize that “the moral sense re-appears day-to-
day with the same morning newness that has from of the fountain of beauty and strength.”91  
When man recognizes that obedience to our inner moral perceptions (self-trust) is the remedy 
for the skepticism that divides man against himself, the scholar has fulfilled his highest purpose. 
The scholar’s continued presence is needed because skepticism is an essential feature of the 
human condition. Filling the void created in modern political thought where the ancient 
statesman once stood, Emerson and his scholar are charged with seeing to the moral health of the 
nation which can only be accomplished by performing the duties of the scholar.92 As Shklar 
reminds us, education as reform is a two-way street where the scholar continues his own process 
of self-reform by learning from those he teaches.93 Through public oration and writing, the 
scholar makes interpretation possible and in this he serves as a representative man. As a private 
figure, the scholar facilitates the ability of the observer to identify with the observed. He is not 
one of Carlyle’s heroes. The scholar is one of us. He employs the same language we do and in 
his example he embodies the aspiration that is man thinking. The scholar aids us is the re-
discovery of our soul and the ethical codes that reside there.94 Emerson, like Plato’s statesman, 
recognizes that the great aim of philosophy and education is the soul.95 Only when the soul is 
properly educated is liberation possible and, at a political level, is genuine self-governance 
possible.96 
 
Emersonian Prospects 
 
The vision of the self-reliant scholar as democratic statesman just laid out is not without its 
problems. In particular, one has to address the question of whether or not Emerson himself 
retreats from the celebration of intellectual power and freedom in “Self-Reliance” only to adopt a 
less optimistic perspective in his later writings? The traditional interpretation of Emerson is that 
he does backtrack from the position he takes in “Self-Reliance.”97 If this is the case, then 
Emerson himself would reject the argument made above. To determine whether or not this is the 
case, this section takes up the relationship between “Self-Reliance” and the text said to contain 
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Emerson’s clearest rebuttal of his earlier position, the first chapter of The Conduct of Life, 
“Fate.” 
Recall that “Self-Reliance” is Emerson’s clarion call for the individual to throw off 
convention and to think for himself. Emerson writes that you should “abide by your spontaneous 
impression with good-humored inflexibility when the whole cry of voices is on the other side.”98 
The self-reliant person is only concerned with what he must do and “not what people think.”99 
Only by discarding the pretensions and propositions of society can man become true to nature’s 
intention and while Emerson’s tone is generally optimistic, the occasional element of doubt can 
be detected. For example, in the midst of his argument for individualism as the solution to the ills 
of society, Emerson admits to being “ashamed” by how “easily we capitulate to badges and 
names, to large societies and dead institutions.”100 That Emerson’s optimism is somewhat 
balanced or checked in “Self-Reliance” is important. To read Emerson’s argument as calling for 
a radical form of individualism is to misread Emerson. As Dolan, Sacks, and Kateb recognize, 
self-reliant activity and thought is not divorced from moral standards.101 Instead, self-reliance is 
framed by moral limits provided by the moral sense. That this is the case is evident when one 
looks at Emerson’s argument in “Fate.” 
Emerson begins “Fate” by raising the fundamental question of ethics: How shall I live?102 In 
order to understand this more fundamental question and answer it, Emerson indicates that one 
must first come to terms with a “polarity” that describes the human condition. This polarity is the 
tension between fate on the one hand and freedom/power on the other.103 In taking up fate, 
Emerson is concerned with the idea of fate as something that tyrannizes the character of man.104 
Knowing that the primary effect of this tyranny is the division of man, Emerson must identify the 
things that actively tyrannize. Emerson refers to these things as fate which he defines as anything 
that limits the individual.105 Of interest here is the imagery Emerson employs. Describing fate as 
a hoop that surrounds the individual, Emerson provides his reader with a visual image that is 
quite similar to his understanding of self-reliant activity being limited or surrounded by the moral 
sense. This suggests that fate is like the moral sense in that it limits or restricts self-reliant 
activity. To the extent that this is correct, one is left to consider the question of how fate differs 
from the moral sense. 
According to Emerson, accepting fate compels one to affirm liberty.106 In affirming liberty 
one also affirms the following: the significance of the individual, the grandeur of duty, and the 
power of character. What is of interest here is the fact that Emerson locates character on the side 
of freedom suggesting that it limits self-reliance in a fundamentally different way than fate does. 
When Emerson takes up the direct relationship between fate and man, he is careful to couch the 
relationship in terms of fate and thought. He says that “Intellect annuls Fate. So far as man thinks 
he is free.”107 Emerson’s careful presentation of the relationship suggests that the great danger 
posed by fate is on the ability of man to think. This is not to say that as long as man thinks he has 
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vanquished fate from his life. Emerson knows better than to make this argument because he 
recognizes that nature, through fate, will always be able to present to man things that have yet to 
be passed under the fire of thought.108 What distinguishes fate from the moral sense is that the 
latter has passed under the fire of thought. Thus, the limitations or restrictions imposed by the 
moral sense are not only understood by man, but placed there as a consequence of his own 
reflection. Thus, at the end of the day all one can hope to accomplish is to harmonize freedom 
and fate which is accomplished through the presence of the moral sentiment. 
If all that can be done to fate and freedom is harmonize them, then both the pessimistic and 
optimistic readings of the relationship between “Self-Reliance” and “Fate” fail to consider the 
possibility that Emerson stakes out a middle position. Pessimists read passages like the following 
as evidence of Emerson conceding the argument that self-reliance will win the day. He writes, 
“The forces which we resist these torrents of tendency looks so ridiculously inadequate, that it 
amounts to little more than a criticism or a protest made by a minority of one, under compulsion 
of millions.”109 The self-reliant individual is doomed to fail in his quixotic enterprise as society 
will perpetually remain “servile from want of will.”110 The problem with this reading is the 
overall balance with which Emerson treats the subject. In the midst of his extended pessimistic 
treatment of fate, Emerson slips in a bit of optimism. He says that fate, when properly used, has 
the effect of lifting our conduct to the loftiness of nature.111 Thus, fate brings man back to his 
proper subject of study (nature) and to the place where he can recover the completeness of his 
being. All man has to do is recognize this and act accordingly. 
The same problem characterizes the optimistic reading. Richardson, for example, reads “Fate” 
as a bold affirmation of the freedom found in “Self-Reliance.”112 The optimistic argument places 
great emphasis on the idea that fate “has its lord” in freedom.113 As its lord, freedom of thinking 
“takes man out of servitude into freedom” as man is now able to “speak from insight” and 
capable of affirming “of himself what is true of the mind.”114 The problem encountered here is 
that Emerson never argues that freedom annuls fate. He only argues that “If Fate follows and 
limits power, power attends and antagonizes Fate.”115 In concluding that freedom and fate must 
always coexist, Emerson concludes that harmony is the best that can be hoped for in this life.116 
Instead of being evidence of backtracking as the pessimists contend, this is a consistent position 
for Emerson and one that makes sense when one considers, in more detail, the place of ethics in 
his understanding of the relationship between freedom and fate. 
According to Emerson, thinking is not the only path to freedom as the moral sentiment also 
makes us free.117 This is not to say that there are two distinct pathways to freedom, but to say 
that freedom and the moral sentiment must combine if man is to bring harmony to his life. They 
must be combined because the perception of truth through the freedom of thought is not, by 
itself, adequate. It must be combined with the moral sense to instill in one the desire to see that 
the truth “shall prevail.”118 From this one sees that what ultimately makes self-trust possible is 
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the blending of intellect and the moral sense. The moral sense confirms the goodness of the 
insight and, as Emerson writes, “insight is not will, nor is affection will. Perception is cold, and 
goodness dies in wishes.”119 When fused together, thought and the moral sense create the will 
and when the energy of the will is created man is able to recognize the right way to go. Seeing it, 
he “moves on that aim” with the world under him for “root and support.”120 Emerson is clear that 
one must be certain that this is the right way to go suggesting that one has not only thought about 
all of the possible options, but that the best option has received the blessing of the moral 
sentiment. Once again, Emerson limits freedom through self-authorship and it is ultimately the 
knowledge that this limitation is the right thing to do that instills in man the courage, resolve, and 
fortitude to combat fate and bring balance to one’s life. In reconciling “Self-Reliance” and 
“Fate” in this way, Emerson agrees with Plato that the scholar as statesman plays a central role in 
harmonizing the human soul and, by extension, society. Without this Emerson like figure, 
harmony and happiness are fleeting or what passes for happiness is, upon closer inspection, 
really a source of misery. 
 
Conclusion 
 
America’s reliance on modern political thought renders the status of the ancient statesman in 
American democracy problematic. Charged with the moral development of the people, the 
ancient statesman takes advantage of there being no distinction between public and private in 
pursuit of the good. In its demotion of the statesman to mere political leader, modern political 
thinking transfers the responsibility of the moral development of the citizenry to the private 
sphere. As argued above, many of the responsibilities of the statesman fall to the public 
intellectual. Here, Ralph Waldo Emerson serves as a representative model of the 
scholar/statesman who is responsible for the character development of the American people. 
Through public gatherings like the Lyceum movement and the publication of essays, Emerson 
both embodies the responsibilities of the scholar/statesman and plays a critical role in democratic 
society by continually striving to check the forces that divide and weaken man. 
When considering Emerson in his role as scholar/statesman, it is worth considering the 
question of whether or not Emerson was successful in his efforts. One would have to answer that 
he was successful and that evidence in support of this conclusion is provided on two fronts. From 
a literary perspective, Emerson strongly influenced the likes of Henry David Thoreau and Walt 
Whitman. In terms of his social influence, Emerson had transformed himself from a writer with 
only regional appeal into a recognized figure on the literary landscape both nationally and 
internationally.121 Emerson makes this transition during the 1840s as a result of his public 
lectures, the publication of two volumes of his essays, The Dial, and his 1847 volume of 
poems.122 So powerful was Emerson’s reputation that when asked to speak to Howard 
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University’s law students at the last minute, Emerson’s improvised talk on what books one ought 
to read caused bookstores in Boston to sell out of the titles mentioned by Emerson.123 
As important as Emerson was in his day, our own time seems to cry out for a 
scholar/statesman as the skepticism Emerson fought so hard to combat seems to have 
degenerated into cynicism. Simply reflecting on recent polling data on the level of public 
disapproval of Congress suggests that the best understanding of America’s evaluation of 
Congress is cynical. Summarizing polling data from Gallup, FOX News, CBS News, ABC 
News/Washington Post, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal, Real Clear Politics shows that, on 
average, only 14.8% of American approve of the job Congress is doing while 76.8% 
disapprove.124 Couple these with the political reality of polarization and continual campaigning 
and we have a recipe for why we should not look to contemporary political leaders to act and 
serve as statesmen. 
To the extent that this is true, we have even greater need for someone in the mold of Emerson 
today. The problem is that the public intellectual appears to be an endangered species. While an 
argument can be made that changes in American culture explain this decline, Russell Jacoby 
argues that a better explanation for this decline is the movement from the intellectual into the 
academy.125 This move is important as an educated, literate public is replaced by professional 
colleagues as the intellectual’s primary audience. As academics, we write monographs for 
specialized journals that require us to situate our thoughts within the context of our field and 
discipline. We do this because our jobs, advancement, and salaries depend on the evaluation of 
other specialists. This dependence, consequently, affects the questions we ask, the issues we 
broach, and the language we employ. By shifting our intellectual activity and talents from the 
public arena to the insular world of the academy we run the risk of failing to transmit our 
[political] culture.126 
All of this raises the following question: Has the academy turned its back on its social 
responsibility? Bruce Kuklick’s study of Harvard’s Department of Philosophy concludes that this 
is, in fact, the case.127 A similar conclusion may be drawn about political science and economics. 
Both disciplines, emphasizing complex statistical models that facilitate publication, suffer from a 
paucity of relevance.128 Do we, as scholars, have public responsibilities akin to those of the 
scholar/statesman? If so, how can we balance these with our professional responsibilities? Can 
this even be done? These are the questions I am left with at the conclusion of this study. Even in 
death, Emerson continues to inspire this reader, at least, to consider his place in the nature of 
things. 
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